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
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CANADA AND THE NAVY

Australia and New Zealand

Methods of Naval Defence

**The Policies of other Self-governing
British Dominions and their
bearing upon the
Naval Controversy in Canada**


Which Policy Should Canada Adopt?

THE CONSERVATIVE POLICY—An immediate expenditure of \$35,000,000 for three battleships as part of a permanent policy of contribution, or in addition to some other policy to be announced later.

THE LIBERAL POLICY—A Canadian Naval Service in accordance with the unanimous resolution of the House of Commons of March 1909.

Issued by the Central Information Office
of the
Canadian Liberal Party, Ottawa, Canada.
(Publication No. 9)

1913



The Australian and New Zealand Methods of Naval Defence Compared with Policies Proposed in Canada.

The policy of the Conservative party is one of contribution. The policy of the Liberal party is the organization of a Canadian Naval Service, in accordance with the unanimous resolution of the House of Commons on March 29th, 1909. The Conservative contribution begins with an immediate expenditure of \$35,000,000 for ships to be placed at the disposition of the British Admiralty, to be manned and maintained by Britain, and placed beyond the control of the Canadian parliament and government. The Liberal proposal is to have this money spent on the organization of a Canadian Naval Service, which will be for the protection of Canadian coasts and trade routes, and available should the need arise for co-operation with the other British Naval forces in the defence of any part of the British Empire.

In the controversy which has arisen, much has been said of **Australia and New Zealand**, and an effort has been made to make it appear that those outlying Dominions are doing more for the British Empire than Canada, that they are more "loyal," have a keener appreciation of national obligations. It is asked if "little New Zealand" can present the Mother Country with a dreadnought, ought not Canada at least to be able to present two or three? The latest form in which this appeal is made is to link up the Malay States, with New Zealand, and compare these two British possessions with the Dominion of Canada.

Fortunately for Canada, it is not difficult to get at the facts, and more fortunately still, they afford an opportunity of contrasting the relative merits of the policies of the two parties in Canada at the present time. **The Conservative policy of contribution is similar to the policy of New Zealand and the Malay States, the Liberal policy of a Canadian Naval Service is the same as the policy of Australia.** Canadians have therefore to choose whether the largest and most important of His Majesty's Dominions shall adopt a method of naval organization agreed to at an Imperial Defence Conference in London, in 1909 in common with Australia, or the method of contribution followed by New Zealand and the Malay States.

Australia abandoned contribution for Naval Service of her own.

Australia has tried both policies herself. She began with a policy of contribution to the British Navy, and found that it was not acceptable, and from many points of view unsatisfactory to Britain as well as herself. She abandoned it and entered upon the policy of an Australian Naval Service which is her present policy. Canadians have therefore to choose whether, with the example of Australia before them, they will enter upon a policy which the next largest Dominion has found it desirable to abandon, or begin with a policy similar to that which experience there has

shown to be the wisest and best. The Borden policy of contribution is similar to the policy of contribution which Australia entered upon and later abandoned. The Laurier policy is the policy which Australia is following at the present time.

New Zealand and Australian Contributions were Payments for Extra Coast Defence.

There is one consideration of a very important nature which has been lost sight of in the references to New Zealand and Australia and that is that even when both were making contributions, and in the case of the New Zealand contribution at the present time, there were stipulations that these contributions were to be for the protection of Australian and New Zealand coasts and were to go towards the payment of ships to be stationed in Australian and New Zealand waters, also to be officered and manned as far as possible by Australians and New Zealanders, so as to open this career to the boys and men of these countries. Up to 1909 the ships, for the payment of which contribution was made, were not to be removed except "with the consent of the colonial government", and since 1909 other provisions have been made to ensure the maintenance of fleets in those waters.

Mr. Borden's proposals contain no stipulations whatever as to the Canadian contribution being applied towards the protection of the Canadian coasts, either on the Atlantic or the Pacific, or to the placing of ships in Canadian waters. Mr. Borden has in fact swung to the other extreme and has deliberately chosen a class of ship unsuited to service in this connection, huge battle-ships which in all probability will be kept in the war zone of Europe, or wherever the possibility of conflict may be greatest in any part of the world. Moreover the ships are to be placed wholly beyond the control of the Canadian parliament and government.

Comparison of Expenditures on Defence.

Those who compare the naval contributions and expenditures of New Zealand, Australia, Newfoundland and other similar possessions with the naval expenditures of Canada are far from doing justice, in the matter of expenditures on defence, to this Dominion. Naval defence is only one part of defence, it is defence at sea, there is also military defence, or defence on land. **Australia, New Zealand and Newfoundland, are all island dominions; to them, land defence is a matter of relatively small concern.** While Canada has important and extensive coast lines, her territory inland extends across a hemisphere a distance of nearly 4,000 miles. Her expenditures in defence have accordingly been for purposes of land defence, and that these expenditures have enabled her to effectively come to the assistance of the Mother country in time of need was well evidenced during the South African war, when Canadian contingents of infantry, cavalry and artillery fully equipped were transported across seas, and rendered valuable service to the Empire in those far off battle fields. **The only fair basis of comparison would be to bring to-**

gether all expenditure on defence, both Naval and Military, and deduct from this what Great Britain herself has been obliged to pay out towards maintaining land and sea forces, in the territories and adjoining waters of the several dominions. It will be found on this basis of comparison that Canada is the only one of the Dominions named to whose immediate defence Great Britain is not obliged to contribute a single cent to-day.

The following is a brief account of conditions which have helped to shape the Australian and New Zealand policies. It will serve to illustrate their bearing upon the Naval controversy in Canada, and the policies proposed here.

The Beginning of Contributions.

At the Conference of 1887, an agreement was made by the British Government with Australia and New Zealand by which the British Government were to add 5 cruisers and 2 torpedo boats to the Imperial Australian squadron to be placed "within the limits of the Australian stations" and not to be removed except "with the consent of the colonial government" and that for such service the colonies (Australia and New Zealand) should pay £126,000 per annum. In 1903, the amount of this contribution was increased to £240,000 per annum. That was the commencement of colonial contributions to the British Navy. "It was an agreement for defence by so many ships for so much money. The ships were provided and the money was paid, Canada had no apprehension of invasion: made no request, paid nothing and got nothing.

Australia Informs England of Desire to Abandon Contributions.

At the Colonial Conference of 1907, just 10 years later, Mr Deakin, the Prime Minister of Australia, told the British government and the representatives of the other self-governing Dominions that the policy of contribution had proven a failure and had given satisfaction neither to the Admiralty or the Commonwealth. He did so in language that is unequivocal, and unmistakable in meaning. Here is what he said,

"In Australia, for reasons which have already been put on record in the despatch which I had the honor of addressing to the Admiralty about two years ago, the existing contribution has not been generally popular. It was passed because it was felt that there was distinct recognition of our responsibility for the defence of our own country and of the Empire of which it is a part, was necessary, and though it did not take the form which commended itself most to the very large minority, possibly even a majority of the electors, we accepted that mode of co-operation until some better presented itself. Further consideration has convinced the public that the present agreement is not satisfactory either to the Admiralty, the political or professional Lords of the Admiralty, or to the Parliament of the Commonwealth. (Proceedings of Colonial Conference 1907 p. 473.)

How Canada came to join with Australia and New Zealand.

In 1909 came the offers of the self-governing Dominions to meet what appeared to be an increasing need on the part of the Motherland. On the 22nd March, the Government of New Zealand telegraphed an offer to bear the cost of the immediate construction of a battleship of the latest type, and of a second of the same type, if necessary. **On the 29th March, the Canadian House of Commons passed a resolution approving the speedy organization of a Canadian Naval Service.** On the 15th April, Mr. Fisher, the Prime Minister of the Australian Government, telegraphed that whereas all the British Dominions ought to share in the burden of maintaining the permanent naval supremacy of the British Empire, so far as Australia was concerned this object would be best attained by the encouragement of the naval development in that country.

A Conference on Naval Defence held in London.

In view of these circumstances, His Majesty's Government considered the time was opportune for the holding of a conference to discuss afresh the relations of the Dominions and the United Kingdom in regard to the question of Imperial Defence, and on the 30th April, His Majesty's Government sent an invitation to the Dominion Ministers of the four Dominions and to the Cape Colonies to attend a Conference to discuss the general question of the naval and military defence of the empire with special reference to the Canadian resolution and to the proposals from New Zealand and Australia.

The Conference was held in London in the summer of 1909. There were present representatives from Australia, New Zealand and Canada, the Canadian representatives being the Hon. Sir Frederick Borden, Minister of Militia and Defence, the Hon. L. P. Brodeur, Minister of Marine and Fisheries, Major General Sir Percy Lake, and Rear Admiral C. E. Kingsmill. The question of naval defence was specially discussed at meetings of the Conference held at the Foreign Office on the 3rd, 5th and 6th of August, the Earl of Crewe being in the chair. It is important to recall that the discussion at this meeting was based on a memorandum prepared by the First Lord of the Admiralty and dated 20th July, which memorandum had been circulated previous to the conference. It was the Admiralty itself, not the representatives of the Dominions that fixed the basis of discussion, and did so before any of the ministers of the self-governing dominions had been consulted. The general discussion was followed by further discussion of arrangement and provision for naval defence between the Admiralty and the representatives of the self-governing Dominions.

The Admiralty Prepare a Memorandum, as basis of Discussion and an agreement reached as respects Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

A perusal of the Memorandum adopted by the Admiralty as a basis of discussion shows that **the Admiralty recognized from the**

outset that in dealing with the Overseas Dominions in the matter of Imperial naval defence, **the choice lay between a contribution and Dominion navies**, and that the principle presented was a larger one than that merely of naval strategy. The contrast is drawn between contribution and local naval forces and in this connection the Admiralty Memorandum says "It has long been recognized that in defining the conditions under which the naval forces of the Empire should be developed, other considerations than those of strategy alone must be taken into account."

Many of these considerations are set forth, not the least important of which is **individual national sentiment**, for the expression of which the memorandum states, "room must be found." So much was it taken for granted that the great Overseas Dominions would wish to recognize this national sentiment, that the memorandum sets forth distinctly as **the work of the Conference**, "the formulating of broad principles upon which the growth of colonial naval forces could be fostered," and distinctly states that the main duty of the Conference as regards naval defence would be to determine the form in which the various Dominion Governments could best participate in the burden of Imperial defence, with due regard to varying political and geographical conditions, and the opinion is expressed that "while laying the foundations of future Dominion navies, to be maintained in different parts of the Empire, these forces would contribute immediately and materially to the requirements of Imperial defence."

As a result of this Conference, **an agreement was come to as respects Canada, Australia and New Zealand and the obligations they were to assume.**

Conference decides Canada to begin organization of Naval service with ships on Atlantic and Pacific.

As respects Canada, the report of the Conference has the following:

"While, on naval strategical considerations, it was thought that a Fleet unit on the Pacific, as outlined by the Admiralty, might in the future form an acceptable system of Naval defence, it was recognized that **Canada's double sea board** rendered the provision of such a fleet unit unacceptable for the present". (Page 26, Imperial Conference 1909).

The Canadian Ministers expressed the amount which in their opinion Parliament would be prepared to vote annually, and **thereupon the Admiralty gave its advice as follows:**

"Taking, first, the plan for the expenditure of £600,000, after discussion the **Admiralty suggested that the Canadian Government might provide a force of cruisers and destroyers** comprising four cruisers of improved "Bristol" class, one cruiser of the "Boadicea" class, and six destroyers of improved 'River' class. As regards sub-marines, it would be advisable to defer their construction because they required a highly-trained and specialized complement.

"The 'Beadicea' and Destroyers might be placed on the Atlantic side, and the 'Bristol' cruisers divided between the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean. The number of officers and men for this force of 11 ships would be 2,194, and the cost of the vessels suggested, including repairs and maintenance, interest and sinking fund on capital expenditure, and pay, &c., of personnel, at Canadian rates, would not, it was anticipated, exceed £600,000 a year.

"Pending the completion of the new cruisers, which would be commenced as early as possible, an arrangement might be made for the loan by the Admiralty of two cruisers of the 'Apollo' class, so that the training of the new naval personnel might be proceeded with at once. The vessels would be fitted up and maintained at the expense of Canada, and the officers and men provided by volunteers from the Royal Navy, but paid by the Canadian Government. They would be lent until they could be replaced from time to time by qualified Canadian officers and men. The Admiralty would be willing also to lend certain officers for organizing duties and for the instruction of seamen, stokers, &c.

"Arrangements would be made to receive Canadian cadets at Osborne and Dartmouth."

Conference decides Australia to construct, man, and maintain a Fleet Unit.

The report gives a summary of what was agreed upon as respects Australia and New Zealand. In a word, the agreement was that **Australia would undertake the construction, manning and maintenance of a Fleet unit, which was to form part of the Eastern Fleet**, to be composed of similar units of the Royal Navy, to be known as the China and East Indies units respectively; and as respects the Australian unit the **vessels were to be manned, as far as possible, by Australian officers and seamen**. In peace time, and while on the Australian station this Fleet unit was to be **under the exclusive control of the Commonwealth Government**. (See report page 57.)

Conference decides New Zealand to Contribute in Payment for Defence.

Sir Joseph Ward speaking for New Zealand said, "I favour one great Imperial Navy with all the overseas Dominions contributing either in ships or money, and with Naval stations at the self-governing Dominions supplied with ships by and under the control of the Admiralty. I however, realize the difficulties, and recognize that Australia and Canada in this important matter are doing that which their respective governments consider to be best. (See report page 59) And elsewhere, "I fully realize that the creation of specific units, one in the East; one in Australia, and, if possible, one in Canada, would be a great improvement upon the existing condition of affairs." The arrangement came to was that **New Zealand would contribute a Dreadnought, which was to**

become the flag ship of the China Pacific unit, and that a portion of the China Pacific unit was to remain in New Zealand waters, two of the New 'Bristol' cruisers, together with three destroyers and two sub-marines were to be detached from the China station in time of peace and stationed in New Zealand waters, that the flagship should make periodical visits to New Zealand waters; and that there should be an interchange in the service of the cruisers between New Zealand and China. The ships were to be manned as far as possible, by New Zealand officers and men. New Zealand was to continue her contribution of \$100,000 per annum which was to "be used to pay the difference in the rates of pay to New Zealanders above what would be paid under the ordinary British rate," any balance to be at the disposal of the Admiralty. (See report page 60).

The Australian and Canadian Methods were to be the Same.

It will thus be seen that the agreement which was come to at the Conference of 1909 was that **Canada and Australia should each undertake local Naval services to be part of and in co-operation with the rest of the British Navy**, the only difference being that Australia would undertake one complete fleet unit to be stationed in Australian waters, Canada would incur a like expenditure, but divide it between ships to be stationed on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. **New Zealand was to present a Dreadnought and to continue her practice of money contribution**, though this was to be in consideration of ships being officered and manned by New Zealanders, maintained, and, excepting the Dreadnought, built at the expense of Great Britain, and stationed in or near New Zealand waters, as part of fleet units intended for the protection of her own coasts.

Here are the two policies at present before the country: the Laurier policy, of a Canadian Naval service, corresponding to the Australian. The Borden policy of contribution by the presentation of three Dreadnoughts, corresponding to the New Zealand contribution of one Dreadnought and money, with these differences that in the case of New Zealand, the Government of that Dominion took care to secure from the Home Government a guarantee of const protection, far in excess of what her contributions amount to, also the actual stationing of ships in New Zealand waters and opportunities of service by New Zealand officers and men, whereas the present Canadian Government, while beginning with a contribution of thirty-five million dollars, has made no provision of any kind.

How the Agreement with the Admiralty has been Carried Out.

It was in accordance with this arrangement that Sir Wilfrid Laurier introduced and the Canadian Parliament in May 1910 passed the **Act respecting a Canadian Naval Service**, under which while the Liberals were in power a beginning was made with the organization of a Canadian Service in accordance with the agreement reached.

Australia carrying out her part of the agreement enacted on November 25th, 1910 an act relating to Naval defence, which is

commonly cited as the **Naval Defence Act 1910**. One or two amendments were added on December 22nd, 1911. A comparison of this Act with the Canadian Naval Service Act shows that **the two measures follow almost identical lines in all essential particulars**. Provision is made in the Australian Act for the establishing of naval forces to be controlled in time of peace by the government of Australia, and available in time of war for co-operation with the other naval forces of the Empire. Provision is made for the establishing of a naval college and naval training, and other matters dealt with in the Canadian Act. It is natural that both measures should have followed similar lines as they were **prepared in accordance with the common plan approved by the British Admiralty**, and with the assistance of naval experts loaned to the governments of Australia and Canada respectively by the British government.

At a second conference held on June 28, 1911 an agreement was concluded between the British Admiralty and representatives of the Dominions of Canada and Australia, respecting the control of the Naval Service and forces of the Dominion of Canada and setting forth the limits of the Canadian and Australian naval stations respectively.

The limits of the Canadian stations were set forth as follows:

"The Canadian Atlantic Station will include the waters north of 30 degrees north latitude and west of the meridian of 40 degrees longitude."

"The Canadian Pacific Station will include the waters north of 30 degrees north latitude and east of the meridian of 180 degrees longitude." The limits of the Australian station were also set forth.

Steady progress made in organization of Royal Australian Navy.

On November 12th, 1910, the government of Australia appropriated the sum of £2,590,000 for naval defence. The statute setting forth that this appropriation is **"toward the construction of a fleet for the naval defence of the Commonwealth"**. Other appropriations were made in the years 1911 and 1912 under direction of the Australian government. Steady progress has been made in the organization of the Australian Naval Service. **On September, 19th 1911, His Majesty King George conferred upon this Service the title of "The Royal Australian Navy,"** and a further recognition has since been given in the Memorandum prepared by the British Admiralty at the request of Mr. Borden and presented by Mr. Borden to the Canadian Parliament on December 5th. Section 7 of the Admiralty Memorandum contains the following:

"Further, at the present time and in the immediate future, Great Britain still has the power, by making special arrangements and mobilizing a portion of the reserves, to send, without courting disaster at home, an effective fleet of battleships and cruisers to unite with **the Royal Australian Navy** and the British squadrons in China and the Pacific for the defence of **British Columbia, Australia and New Zealand.**"

Had the Borden administration continued the organization of a Canadian Naval Service upon the lines agreed to with Australia and the British Admiralty, there can be little doubt that His Majesty

King George would ere this have conferred upon the Canadian service the title of the Royal Canadian Navy, and that any references to the defence of Canada which British Admiralty reports might have contained would not have made this country dependent upon the Royal Australian Navy, but would have referred to the Royal Canadian Navy as a naval organization likely to be of service should the need ever arise in the defence of Australia and New Zealand.

The Present and Future Development of the Royal Australian Navy.

What progress has been made by the Australian government in the creation of its navy and how this progress is viewed by Great Britain will be apparent from the following quotation from an article entitled **the Australian Naval Progress**, which appears in the **London Times** of August 14th, 1912:

"Beyond doubt the most striking sign today of the national development of the overseas Dominions is the establishment of the Australian navy. When all criticisms, favourable or otherwise, are summed up **there remains the unalterable fact that Australia is launching her own fleet because she wants it.** The overseas Dominions, **outgrown the stage of colonies,** are fast acquiring a responsibility abroad which Britain at home could not prohibit even if she would, yet **nothing could be more loyal than their spirit toward the Mother country** and the manner in which they offered to share the Mother country's burden. . . . It is about as useless to question here in England whether Australia should be allowed to own a navy as whether Germany should. It is a matter over which England herself has humanly no control. **The establishment of its own fleet by the younger British nation arises from popular demand, which is to say, popular instinct.**"

After setting out the names and sizes of the several ships constructed the article continues:

"These ships here described. . . . one Dreadnought cruiser, three smaller cruisers, six Destroyers and three submarines. compose what is known as **the Australian fleet unit as arranged at the Imperial Defence Conference of 1909.**"

The article at this point goes on to describe the considerably **larger plans of naval construction and equipment** which have been adopted since the Imperial Defence Conference of 1909 on the recommendation of Admiral Henderson and which contemplate **an expenditure of £22,500,000 spread over 22 years,** divided into four eras, the first of seven and the other three, of five years each, so that the fleet may grow in accordance with increase of personnel required.

How New Zealand has Carried out her Part of Agreement.

New Zealand under the Naval Subsidy Act of 1908 undertook to contribute annually the sum of £100,000. Under the Naval Defence Act of 1909, the Minister of Finance of New Zealand was

empowered to contract on such terms as he saw fit with the Admiralty for the complete arming and equipment in the United Kingdom of a ship of war, the total cost of the ship and armament not to exceed £2,000,000 and the ship to form part of the Royal Navy. The New Zealand Statute sets forth that the ship when completed is to form part of the Royal Navy and serve under the control of the Lords of the Admiralty but not, as is Mr. Borden's proposal with reference to the Canadian ships "to range itself in the battle line of the Empire," its sphere of action is definitely limited to the **"defence of your Majesty's Dominions"**, the British Admiralty having arranged for other ships in connection with the China Pacific unit to be stationed in New Zealand waters. The New Zealand government has since ermitted the original agreement to be temporarily waived as respects the Dreadnought contributed by New Zealand being kept as the flag ship of the China Pacific fleet the understanding being, however, that equivalent protection will be given by Britain at her expense to New Zealand coasts, and other ships kept in New Zealand waters.

Mr. Borden's Proposals Involve Breach of Arrangement with Australia and New Zealand.

Canada alone of the three mentioned overseas Dominions appears to have failed to keep the arrangement reached with the British Admiralty on the basis of an understanding which included all three. A beginning in the carrying out of this agreement was made by the Laurier administration in the enactment of the Naval Service Act of 1910, and progress was made under this measure in the organization of a Canadian Naval Service. **Had the Borden Ministry on assuming office continued the work of its predecessor, Canada would in all probability be today in the same position as Australia,** and would have been saved the reproach contained in the Admiralty Memorandum which declares in paragraph 9 that "any action on the part of Canada" would be regarded as "most significant of the **renewed** resolve" of the overseas Dominions to take their part in maintaining the integrity of the Empire.

Nothing having been done since the Borden Ministry assumed office in October 1911 in the carrying out of the agreement reached at the London Conference in 1909, it is little wonder that the British Admiralty has drawn attention to the necessity of some evidence of a renewed resolve, and also that **exception is now being taken by Australia to Canada's neglect in carrying out her part of the agreement** which was to have been undertaken in common with other of the self-governing Dominions. The Canadian Associated Press, in a cable despatch London Feb. 26th 1913 which has been published in the leading Canadian papers of the day following says that the Commonwealth authorities in London issued on that morning the text of an important statement made recently by **Senator Pearce, the Australian Minister of Defence,** on the question of imperial naval defence in which Hon. Mr. Pearce explained that the Australian Government attaches no importance to its being represented on the Imperial Defence Committee, because it is of a purely advisory character while Australia is concerned in questions

of policy rather than administration, also that Mr. Pearce refers to the decisions arrived at at the conference of 1909 when Canada and Australia decided upon naval services of their own, and says the Australian agreement is the only one that has been carried out. That it therefore, becomes necessary for Canada to either carry out the scheme adopted by the 1909 Conference, or propose some other to take its place. The report despatch then says referring to Mr. Pearce's utterances:

"He could not say whether there was any truth in the report that the Admiralty authorities had been parties to the suppression of the Canadian naval scheme and the substitution of contributed Dreadnoughts and an annual subsidy, on the New Zealand plan, in preference to that of the creation of separate colonial naval units. We have not been given any hint either by the British government or the Admiralty that they have changed their minds. In regard to the wisdom of the agreement with Australia, that agreement, I may say, originated with the Admiralty scheme for a fleet unit and did not originate with the Australian government of the day or with the representatives at the Conference."

From this despatch it will be seen that the substitution by Mr. Borden of a contribution of \$35,000,000 for the 3 most powerful battleships in the world appears to Australia to be a complete departure from the agreement reached with the British Admiralty by Canada and herself at the Conference in June, 1909, and that far from being acceptable to a sister Dominion this change has produced an embarrassment of which Australia is disposed to complain. It may well be asked if the unity and interests of the Empire are likely to be furthered when it is found necessary to call in question the faith of this Dominion, because of a change in policy born wholly of political expediency.

Mr. Borden Himself in Parliament Strongly Favours Australian and Canadian Naval Services.

That the change is due to political expediency and not to Mr. Borden's own conviction or the convictions of the Hon. George E. Foster, the next most important member of his Cabinet, is amply proven by the strong endorsement given by each of these gentlemen to the Australian policy of a naval service in preference to the policy of a contribution either in ships or money to the Imperial Admiralty.

In the debate on the resolution of March 1909, Mr. Borden at that time Leader of the Opposition set forth his views upon the desirability of organizing a Canadian Naval Service and elaborated somewhat in detail the reasons why Canada should proceed with a service of her own and not adopt any policy of contribution. After carefully analyzing Canada's export trade and what was being spent by the Dominion on military defence, Mr. Borden stated that in his opinion "not less than half of the amount appropriated should be devoted to Naval instead of to Military defence."

Mr. Borden said "I would like to point out to the country and the House some considerations which lead me to this conclusion". Here are the considerations as given by Mr. Borden himself. "Where is the great market of the people of Canada today? We know that

it is across the Atlantic ocean, and we believe that in years to come it will also be across the Pacific ocean. The great market of Canada today is not the market which would be especially safeguarded and preserved to us by the expenditure of a large amount of money for military purposes, but it is a market which may be preserved to us by expenditure for naval purposes.

"I venture to submit to you, Mr. Speaker, and to the members of this House, that the expenditure in defence of our seaports, in defence of our coasts and in defence of the waters of the ocean, which are immediately adjacent to our coasts, is of immensely greater importance and of immensely greater advantage than the expenditure which, year after year, we are disbursing in connection with the military forces of this country.

"I do not desire to minimize them, but I do desire to emphasize, as far as may be in my power, the importance to Canada of some attempt at naval defence, of the defence of our seaports and the protection of our commerce.

"Let us look at the question from another aspect. How many cities and towns are there in Canada which would be open to the raids of a second or third class cruiser, as pointed out by my hon. friend from North Toronto? I suppose there are not less than forty or fifty cities and towns in Canada of 2,000 population or upwards which would be open to the raid of an enemy coming against our coasts. Let us not forget that the danger pointed out to the Commonwealth of Australia by the Admiralty itself was the imminence of a movement of that kind in Australian waters and against the Australian coasts in case the Empire should unfortunately become involved in any great Naval war. We are all aware today that the policy of the British Admiralty is a policy of concentration, and we are all aware that the Australian naval programme which has recently been entered into with the full approval and consent of the mother country, is altogether designed to guard the coasts of Australia against a danger of that kind.

"In so far as my right hon. friend the Prime Minister (Sir Wilfrid Laurier) today outlined the lines of naval defence of this country I am entirely at one with him. I am entirely of opinion, in the first place, that the proper line upon which we should proceed in that regard is the line of having a Canadian naval force of our own. I entirely believe in that. The other experiment has been tried as between Australia and the mother country and it has not worked satisfactorily in any respect. In Great Britain the contribution has perhaps been regarded as rather unsatisfactory. In Australia it failed, in the end, to meet with the approval of the people for the reason that Great Britain felt constrained to ask Australia that the field of operations of the squadron should be extended to the China and Indian seas; and when the operation of that squadron was so extended, the Australians felt that the contribution which they had been making for some years past was not really being used to give that protection to Australia which her interests demanded. So that, the policy of Australia at the present time is to build up a flotilla of sub-marines and torpedo boats which, in case of war, would co-operate with the armed cruisers

and battleships of the British Navy. It was pointed out in discussing this question that **Australia in providing a force of that kind would provide a force which it would be very difficult, if not impossible for Great Britain to send across the seas, and that in thus protecting themselves they were providing the best possible force for the protection of the Empire.** So, I am at one with the Prime Minister as far as this is concerned. I am at one with him in this respect also that I think that **an expenditure of money designed for that purpose, ought, in the main at least, to be under the control of our own Parliament and that by making an appropriation of that kind and attending to the defence of our own coasts, by co-operation and co-ordination with the Imperial naval forces, we would be rendering a real service in the defence of the Empire and we would be doing our duty not only to Canada, but to the Empire as a whole."**

(Hansard, House of Commons Debates, March 29, 1909, p. 3515-3518.)

Hon. Geo. E. Foster also favours a Canadian Naval Service and opposes Contribution.

In the same debate (March 1909) the **Hon. George E. Foster**, who introduced the resolution, **pointed out the many objections there were to a policy which involved contributions and dwelt not less strongly on the advantages of a Canadian Navy.**

After concluding his reference to the former, Mr. Foster said: "You will notice that while I have tried to discuss the pros and cons in connection with this method, while I have stated reasons in favour of and others against it, **my own mind tends rather towards the employment of another form than that of an out and out money contribution.**" (Hansard, March 20, 1909 page 3496). That other form Mr. Foster described in the sentence immediately following. "The second policy to which I would refer is **the assuming by ourselves of the defence of our ports and coasts, in constant and free co-operation with the imperial forces of the mother country.**"

(Hansard, March 20, 1909, page 3496)

Here are the two methods being considered at the present time. Mr. Borden's method—an out and out money contribution for ships—Sir Wilfrid's Laurier's method the defence of our own ports and coasts in constant and free co-operation with the imperial forces. **Mr. Foster's whole speech** should be read, it will be found in the House of Commons debate of March 29, 1909. (Hansard, page 3484 to 3503 inclusive). It is **a lengthy and able advocacy of the present Laurier policy and a not less strong denunciation of the present Borden plan.**

Mr. Borden strongly endorses Plan of a Canadian Naval Service while in England.

But Mr. Borden did not confine his advocacy of a Canadian Naval Service to his speech in the House of Commons. He spoke out strongly in favour of the present Liberal Policy in England, and more strongly upon his return in Halifax and Toronto.

The London Times of July 2nd, 1909, contains the following reference to the Canadian Naval Service in a speech by Mr. Borden delivered at the Constitutional Club in London on the previous day.

"With regard to the question of Imperial defence, he (Mr. Borden) was convinced that the people of Canada were prepared to take their full share when necessary in securing the safety and integrity of the Empire. He believed that the resolutions on Imperial defence which were passed by an unanimous vote in Canada had been misunderstood there, as well as in this country. The subject was undoubtedly one of great importance to the Empire and Canada. He was aware that some feeling was created in the British Isles owing to the fact that Canada did not by resolution or by speech from the Prime Minister vouchsafe the offer of one, two, or three Dreadnoughts. He thought the resolution in the form in which it was passed, while its terms might not upon their surface seem as significant at the moment as the offer of one or two dreadnoughts would have been, laid down a permanent policy for the Dominion of Canada upon which both parties united and which would serve a more practical purpose than any such offer of dreadnoughts. The effect of the resolutions which were passed was: (1) That they recognized the duty of Canada to take her share in Imperial defence as her wealth and importance increased; (2) that the payment of regular and periodical contributions to the Imperial Treasury was not, as far as Canada was concerned, the most satisfactory solution of the problem of Imperial defence; (3) that the House would approve of any expenditure necessary for the speedy establishment of a Canadian navy in close relation to and in co-operation with the Imperial navy and along the lines suggested by the Admiralty at the last Imperial conference; and (4) that the Canadian people would be prepared to make any sacrifices necessary for the purpose of co-operating with the Imperial Navy in maintaining the integrity of the Empire and its Naval supremacy."

Mr. Borden Strongly Endorses Plan of a Canadian Naval Service before Electors in Canada.

In a public address delivered at Halifax on October 14th, 1909 Mr. Borden not only spoke on the advantages of a Canadian Navy, but anticipated and replied to most of the arguments which he and his followers are to-day urging against it. Here are some of the extracts from Mr. Borden's speech as reported in the leading Canadian papers on the day following. "Mr. Brodeur says, he has secured naval autonomy for Canada. There is not and there never has been for the past forty years any constitutional or other difficulty about the establishment of a navy by Canada whenever its people thought fit to adopt that course.

"Nationhood involves certain responsibilities from which we cannot escape. One of these responsibilities is the duty of defending our borders and of taking effective steps to protect our commerce and our trade routes.

"The House of Commons last session laid down a certain

policy touching naval defence in which both political parties united.

"One governing principle at least should control, namely, that out of our own materials, by our own labor and by the instructed skill of our own people any necessary provision for our naval defence should be made so far as may be reasonably possible.

"To-day should be Nova Scotia's opportunity. Providence has endowed this province with the material, with the men and with the maritime situation which are essential not only for developing a scheme of naval defence and protection, but also for the resuscitation of that shipbuilding industry which once made Nova Scotia famous throughout the world."

At Toronto on November 1st, 1909, Mr. Borden was no less explicit. The Ottawa Citizen and other Canadian papers on November 2, 1909 contained a full account of an address given by Mr. Borden at the Conservative Club rooms in that city, on that night.

Here are a few extracts:

"Mr. Borden spoke with great deliberation and evidently weighed his words carefully. He unhesitatingly reaffirmed his adherence to the national defence policy outlined in the House of Commons resolution passed last March."

"The integrity of the Empire can best be preserved by co-operation in defence and in trade."

"Without adequate naval defence our ships would be liable to capture, our shores to raid, our cities to tribute."

"The will of the people, must prevail; but I believe it will affirm what Parliament with unanimous voice has declared."

"Public opinion must be considered and recognized."

"It is my own belief that a Canadian unit of the Imperial navy may be made powerful and effective. I also believe that in any such undertaking our own natural resources and raw material, and, above all, our laboring population, ought to be considered and employed as far as may be reasonably possible. That course is incident to the policy of protection."

"But the remedy is not to be found in any abnegation or abandonment of the functions of self-government. Otherwise we should hand over to Great Britain all our great spending departments for better administration."

These quotations are sufficient to show that Mr. Borden clearly understands the difference between what is involved in a policy of contribution and a policy of a Canadian Naval service, and that notwithstanding his firm advocacy of the latter prior to becoming involved with the Nationalists of Quebec, and the jingoes in England, he has now for the sake of avoiding an appeal to the people as well possibly as for other reasons, deliberately abandoned the Naval service idea, for a policy of contribution.

Mr. Borden's Proposed Contribution Enough to Construct and Equip Two Fleet Units as Outlined by the Admiralty.

The change is more remarkable in virtue of the amount of money which Mr. Borden proposes to expend on the first contribu-

tion. Roughly speaking \$35,000,000 is almost sufficient to fully construct and equip two complete fleet units. At the Conference in London in June 1909, the Admiralty set forth a kind of fleet unit which it was prepared to advocate as the most suitable for coast defence and for co-operation with other units of the Royal Navy. The following is quoted from the Admiralty Memorandum presented to the Imperial Defence Conference 1909, and signed by the First Lord of the Admiralty.

"In the opinion of the Admiralty, a Dominion Government desirous of creating a navy should aim at forming a distinct Fleet unit; and the smallest unit is one which, while manageable in time of peace, is capable of being used in its component parts in time of war.

"The Fleet unit to be aimed at should, therefore, in the opinion of the Admiralty, consist at least of the following.

1 Armoured cruiser (new "Indomitable" class, which is of the "Dreadnought" type),

3 Unarmoured cruisers ("Bristol" class),

Destroyers,

3 Submarines.

with the necessary auxiliaries, such as depot and store ships, &c., which are not here specified.

"Such a Fleet unit would be capable of action not only in the defence of coasts, but also of the trade routes, and would be sufficiently powerful to deal with small hostile squadrons should such ever attempt to act in its waters.

"The estimated first cost of building and arming such a complete Fleet unit would be approximately £3,700,000 (\$18,019,000).

Mr. Borden's proposals intended to cause abandonment of Canadian Naval Service.

In view of the circumstance that the amount which Mr. Borden proposes shall be given as a first contribution is an amount almost equivalent to what would be sufficient to construct and equip a fleet unit on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, is there not apart from everything else the strongest reason for believing that **his proposal is to discontinue the Canadian Naval Service altogether.** The circumstance that both Mr. Borden and his followers during the course of the debate in advocating the proposed expenditure of \$35,000,000, have endeavoured to minimize the value of a Canadian Service, and to suggest every conceivable obstacle in the way of its development, indicates pretty clearly that **the present amount is but the first of a series of contributions** which the Dominion of Canada will be called upon to make to the British Admiralty because of having no Service for its own Coast defence, or for co-operation with other naval forces of the British Empire in time of need.

The talk of having a voice in foreign policy a mere subterfuge and a feature of the Nationalist Conservative Alliance.

Mr. Borden is saying that any Dominion undertaking to share upon a permanent basis in the sea defence of the Empire must have

some voice in the policy which shapes the issues of war and peace, and is giving as a reason for not bringing down a permanent policy, the fact that it will take some time to work out this partnership in foreign policy.

Without more than alluding to the fact that the British government has informed Mr. Borden that foreign policy is a matter that cannot and will not be shared, it is sufficient to point out that **expression was never given to any thought of the kind when in 1909 Mr. Borden was advocating the policy of a Canadian Naval Service**, also that in the speech delivered by Mr. Borden in Halifax on October 14th he expressly stated that if the permanent policy of Canada were to be a Canadian naval service no constitutional difficulty of any kind could arise. He said

"Mr. Brodeur says he has secured naval autonomy for Canada. **There is not and there never has been for the past forty years any constitutional or other difficulty about the establishment of a navy by Canada whenever its people thought fit to adopt that course.**"

Neither Australia nor New Zealand have ever raised any question of the kind and each of these dominions is at the present time carrying out a permanent policy of Naval defence. Australia, the policy of a Naval Service of her own, New Zealand the policy of contribution to the British Admiralty.

The truth is that Mr. Borden would never have thought of laying any stress on reasoning of this kind were it not that the Nationalists of Quebec with whom he is so closely allied have given as a reason for their opposition to any permanent policy of Imperial defence the absence of any voice by Canada in the Government of the Empire, and by raising this point Mr. Borden hopes to convince the Nationalists that he does not intend to have a permanent policy, and to appearances the blame for this will be upon England, because she will not give Canada a voice in peace and war.

The Nationalists' attitude is well set out in the following resolution:—

After an address at St. Eustache at Quebec by Mr. Henri Bourassa on July 7th 1910, the following resolution was carried:—

"But confident in the greatness and efficiency of the principles of centralization and of autonomy as solemnly proclaimed and recognized since more than a half century by the authorities of Great Britain and those of Canada, we are opposed to any new policy which would entangle us in distant wars, foreign to Canada, so long as the autonomous colonies of the Empire do not share with the Mother Country upon a footing of equality the Sovereign authority in matters relating to the Imperial army and navy, treaties of peace and of alliance, foreign relations, the Government of India and the possessions of the Crown."

After their victory on November 3rd 1910, in the Drummond-Arthabaska by-election a Nationalist gathering to celebrate the victory was held at Montreal on the night of the 9th. At this meeting the following resolution was carried:

"This meeting considers as contrary to the principles of the autonomy of Canada and to the real unity of the Empire any policy

tending to impose upon Canada, which has no voice in the Government of the Empire, any part whatsoever of its exterior charges, or of its military defence outside of Canadian territories."

There are many who believe that this resolution was the inspiration of the following remarks made by Mr. Borden in the House of Commons 16 days later:

"If Canada and the other Dominions of the Empire are to take their part as nations of this Empire in the defence of the Empire as a whole, shall it be that we, contributing to that defence of the whole Empire, shall have absolutely, as citizens of this country, no voice whatever in the councils of the Empire touching the issues of peace or war throughout the Empire? I do not think that such would be a tolerable condition. I do not believe the people of Canada would for one moment submit to such a condition. Shall members of this House, representatives of more than 221 constituencies of this country, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, shall no one of them have the same voice with regard to these vast Imperial issues that the humblest tax payer in the British Isles has at this moment?"

Yet while saying this to please the Nationalists, Mr. Borden to please the jingoes now brings down a Bill to make provision for the "Naval forces of the Empire" without having obtained any voice in the councils of the Empire.

The Bearing of Australia's Example upon Canada.

It is perhaps only necessary to point out that Mr. Borden is no more called upon, than is the Prime Minister of Australia or the Prime Minister of New Zealand to frame a naval policy which may serve to ensure the safety of the British Empire. As Prime Minister of Canada, the Canadian people, however, have a right to expect from him as the people of Australia and New Zealand had from their governments, a permanent policy for the protection of Canada's coasts and trade routes and a policy which will permit, should the need ever arise, of Canada doing her part through co-operation with other naval forces of the Empire, in the maintenance of its sea supremacy, just as during the South African war she was in a position, though without a voice in foreign policies to come, along with the other British Dominions to the assistance of the Mother country in time of need.

It remains only to add that in the fact, that Australia with a population of less than five millions, a dominion less extensive in territory, wealth, and resources than Canada, has been able to satisfactorily work out the conditions of the agreement entered into with the British Admiralty along with Canada, any argument to the effect that Canada is unable to do what Australia has already done falls to the ground.

The argument that Canada could not find men sufficient to train for a Naval Service of her own is answered by the example of Australia where labour is more scarce than it is in Canada. It is further answered by the first report of the Deputy Minister

of the Canadian Naval Service which suggests that recruiting for the training ships had been found easy, and that little difficulty in further recruiting was anticipated. The second report of the Deputy Minister of Naval Defence explains that the recruiting had fallen off owing to the uncertainty under the present administration of what the permanent Naval policy is to be.

The insinuation that is sometimes heard that the Canadian Naval Service means independence and separation is also answered by the example of Australia. No one so much as suggested that Australia in abandoning the policy of contribution and entering upon a policy of her own had in so doing any thought of separation from the British Empire. Why then should any suggestion of the kind be made with reference to Canada?

The Right Hon. James Bryce, British Ambassador to the United States, speaking before the Canadian Club in Ottawa on March 9, of this year said: "Both in Australia and New Zealand there has been of late years a very marked palpable growth of the sentiment of Imperial unity." This covers the very time that Australia has been engaged upon a Naval Service of her own.

Those who urge the argument of separation and independence forget that they **impeach the loyalty of Mr. Borden and every Conservative in the House of Commons during the last Parliament** inasmuch as the resolution to which Parliament unanimously agreed was the resolution for a Canadian Naval Service along lines identical to the Service established in Australia.

The kind of appeal which finds it necessary to call in question the loyalty of the people's representatives in Parliament is hardly deserving consideration of thinking men, and certainly is not worthy the name of patriotism.

Recent Declarations by Outlying Dominions in Favour of Naval Service as Opposed to Contribution.

Since the debate on Mr. Borden's proposals commenced in the Canadian parliament, other parts of the Empire have come to see that the real question at issue is whether the outlying Dominions shall be permitted to have naval services under the control of their own parliaments, or be obliged to contribute towards the support of some scheme of centralization, and **the representatives of the several outlying Dominions have begun to speak out and make it quite clear that in their opinion centralization is not a desirable thing for the British Empire, and that the right policy for Canada to follow at the present time is that of having a naval service of her own.**

A Canadian Associated Press Cable of date London, March 12th, has the following in reference to a speech delivered by **Sir George Reid, the High Commissioner of Australia, at the Royal Colonial Institute on the night previous:**

"Sir George Reid, high commissioner of Australia, made an interesting reference to the question of Imperial Defence, expressing

the opinion that the time was not far distant when Canada would have to undertake the defence of the North Pacific and North Atlantic, New Zealand and Australia safeguarding the South Pacific, while India must eventually take a substantial share in the naval defence of the East.

"Such a scheme, he said, would leave England free to concentrate in the North Sea, and a large proportion of the trade routes.

"Sir George thought that the Australian policy of having its own navy, operating in conjunction with the British fleet, was an example that must eventually be followed by all self-governing Dominions."

The same despatch has the following in reference to Sir Joseph Ward, former Premier of New Zealand, "Sir Joseph Ward said he agreed with Sir George that it was impossible that any self-governing Dominion would consent to return to the old system of government under central authority."

The Canadian Associated Press Cable dated London March 14th, has the following with reference to a speech made by the New Zealand Defence Minister in which the latter has made it plain that New Zealand would not long continue her present system of contribution. The speech is as follows:

"Speaking at a meeting of the Empire Parliamentary Association yesterday, Hon. Col. Allen, New Zealand's Minister of Defence, said that the payment of a naval subsidy would not, in the long run, appeal to the Dominion sentiment of patriotism. A permanent policy was needed, but this could hardly be said to exist under the Canadian (i.e. Borden) or New Zealand scheme. He, of course, valued to the fullest extent the steps taken by New Zealand and Canada, but they needed a permanent policy and one which would endure. What they wanted was a living thing in which the dominions would have a vital interest.

"It did not matter so much for the moment where Dreadnoughts were built; that could be arranged as conditions developed in the future. What did matter was that it should be realized that the dominions would not be content with merely putting their hands in their pockets. (Hear, hear.)

"The Imperial Navy must be a living reality to them to which they contributed, not merely money, but men. There was more value in the lives of their men than in the life of a ship. The dominions must have the opportunity of doing their duty towards the personnel of the fleet and manning the Empire's ships at sea. They must be prepared to help, not only the imperial fleet with material, but they must have an interest in the operations of the fleet itself."

The Real Question at Issue.

The question then before the people of Canada at this time is whether this country shall keep good faith in the matter of an

agreement to which other of the self-governing Dominions of the Empire are also parties, and continue, as Australia is doing, the organization of a Canadian Naval Service along lines similar to that of the Royal Australian Navy, and in accordance with the unanimous resolution of the House of Commons, or whether, for the sake of political expediency, Canada shall sacrifice her national honour and change to a policy of contribution similar to that abandoned by Australia, and one which New Zealand is finding to be unsatisfactory and unsuitable, not less on patriotic than on other grounds.

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